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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD V. TOLMAN, 
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Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 14,625 
K-MART ENTERPRISES OF 
UTAH, INC., a Utah corp-
oration, and JEFF T. DONG, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF TtJE CASE 
This is an action for false ^rrest allegedly 
occurring on November 16, 1974. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER C|OURT 
The District Court granted Defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment based upon the Statute of Limitations, 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The granting of the Motion fo|r Summary Judgment 
should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree generally with the State-
ment of Facts as presented in Appellant's Brief. 
Respondents submit, however, that the Statement of Facts 
in Appellant's Brief is overly detailed and contains 
many irrelevant factual allegations. 
The operative facts of this case, briefly sum-
marized, are as follows (all page references to the 
transcript of the pretrial conference) : 
1. The plaintiff went into the Orem K-Mart 
Store on November 16, 1974 (page 2). 
2. At that time he was apprehended by the 
defendants for attempted shoplifting because it appeared 
that he had switched some price tags on an item and had 
gone to the checkout stand paying the lesser amount 
(page 2 and 3, page 5). 
3. This action was initiated more than one 
year thereafter, the Complaint being filed on December 
15, 1975, and Summons served on December 19, 1975. The 
plaintiff's Complaint sought damages for the alleged false 
2 
arrest and alleged that the defendant$ "arrested Plain-
tiff, took him to a room in the back of the store and 
falsely and maliciously detained and ijmprisoned Plain-
tiff and falsely brought charges agaiqst Plaintiff for 
theft" (Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 6), 
4. The sole basis for Plaintiff's Complaint 
was an alleged false arrest and imprisonment of the 
plaintiff as is stated clearly in Plaintiff's Complaint 
and as admitted by Plaintiff's counsel on page 2 of the 
transcript of the pretrial proceedings. 
5. The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 
or for Summary Judgment which was treaffced by the Court 
as a Motion for Summary Judgment, and (granted, it being 
undisputed that the plaintiff's Complaint v/as not filed 
within one year. 
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AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
It is undisputed that the plaintiff's Complaint 
herein was not filed until more than one year after the 
alleged false arrest. The false arrest allegedly oc-
curred on November 16, 1974, and the Complaint was not 
filed until December, 1975. 
The plaintiff's claim, being one for false 
arrest, is governed by Section 78-12-29, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), which provides for a one year Statute of Limi-
tations in "an action for libel, slander, assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment or seduction" (emphasis added). 
Respondents agree generally with the proposi-
tion asserted by the appellants to the effect that the 
Statute of Limitations should only bar those actions 
which are clearly covered thereby. 
The appellants contend that the statute should 
not be strained or applied in an overly strict manner, 
nor should the meaning of the terms thereof be strained 
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in order to bar the plaintiff's claim. The respondents 
agree with that proposition, but would remind the Court 
that neither, on the other hand, should the terms of 
the statute be strained in order to remove the bar to 
a cause of action v/hich otherwise clearly is within the 
plain language and intent of the statute. 
The general rule relating to construction of 
Statutes of Limitation is as set forth in Section 50 of 
51 AmJur2d, Limitation of Actions, pag^ 630: 
Formerly, the defense afforded by the 
Statute of Limitations was not treated 
with the same favor as ordinary defenses, 
and being looked on with disfavor, Stat-
utes of Limitation wete strictly con-
strued, particularly since such statutes 
are invariably in derogation of the com-
mon law. Nov/, however, the judicial 
attitude is in favor of Statutes of Lim-
itation, rather than otherwise, since 
they are considered ap statutes of repose 
and as affording security against stale 
claims. Consequently], except in the 
case of Statutes of Limitation against 
the government, the Courts are inclined 
to construe limitatioh laws liberally, 
so as to affect the intention of the 
legislature. 
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The principle that Statutes of Limita-
tion are to be liberally construed does 
not mean, however, that the usual rules 
of statutory construction will be ig-
nored. The Courts will not strain 
either the facts or the law in favor 
of a Statute of Limitations, nor should 
such a statute be extended by the 
Courts or be applied to cases not clearly 
within the statutory provisions. But 
neither should a Court give a strained 
construction in order to evade the 
effect of a Statute of Limitations. 
The Statute of Limitations is regarded as a statute of 
repose and must be given a fair and reasonable construc-
tion and application, Gibson v. Jensen, 158 Pac. 426, 48 
Utah 244. 
Since the plaintiff's Complaint sounds solely 
in false arrest, and it is undisputed that the Complaint 
was not filed until more than one year after the cause 
of action accrued, the Summary Judgment granted by the 
Lower Court must be affirmed unless, as contended by 
Appellant, there is a difference between the tort of 
false imprisonment and false arrest. 
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POINT II. FALSE ARREST AND FALSE 
IMPRISONMENT ARE THE SAME TORT. 
Appellant attempts to circumvent the Statute 
of Limitations by claiming that his Complaint is for 
"false arrest" and that the Statute of Limitations 
only applies to "false imprisonment". The plaintiff 
cites several cases and authorities for the proposition 
that there are in fact two separate causes of action 
or torts. 
The case of Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods, 
538 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1975), does nothing more than state 
in the introductory paragraph that the plaintiff had 
sued Zinikfs for false arrest, false imprisonment and 
malicious prosecution. No distinction is drawn by the 
Court between the various causes of action. 
The case of Thompson v. General Finance Co., 
468 P.2d 269 (Kan. 1970), simply uses fche terms "false 
arrest" and "false imprisonment" interchangeably and 
the Opinion makes it clear that the Kansas Supreme 
Court was only talking about one "wrong" or "tort". 
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The issue considered by the Court was simply the distinc-
tions between false arrest and malicious prosecution. 
The "distinction between the two" which was 
supposedly made in McGlone v. Landreth, 195 P.2d 268 
(Okla. 1948), was simply that "in a false arrest, false 
imprisonment exists, but the detention is by reason of 
an asserted legal authority to enforce the processes 
of the law; in a false imprisonment, the detention is 
purely a matter between private persons for a private 
end . . . " The "distinction" referred to is a direct 
quote from 22 AmJur, False Imprisonmentf Section 3, 
Appellant did not set forth the entire quote from 
22 AmJur; the preamble to that quoted portion states: 
As is seen from the definitions, false 
arrest and false imprisonment as causes 
of action are indistinguishable. The 
only distinction lies in the manner in 
which they arise. (Emphasis added.) 
None of the authorities cited by Appellant stand for the 
proposition that a claim for false arrest is not governed 
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by a Statute of Limitations similar to Section 78-12-
29, Utah Code Ann. No case has been located by counsel 
for Respondents which stands for such a proposition, or 
even infers that there is such a distinction. 
The tort of false imprisonmeht was first de-
fined by the Utah Supreme Court in Smiih v. Clark, 106 
Pac. 653 (Utah 1910). In an Opinion written by Chief 
Justice Straup it was noted: 
False imprisonment is the unlawful 
arrest and detention of the person of 
another, with or without a warrant or 
other process. It consists in an un-
lawful restraint upon a manls person, 
or control over the freedom of his 
movement, by force or threats . • . 
The actual detention of the person, 
and the unlawfulness thereof, consti-
tute the trespass; the gravaman being 
the unlawfulness of the imprisonment 
or the detention. 
Appellant cites the case of Hepworth v. Covey 
Bros. Amusement Co., 91 P.2d 507, 97 Utah 205 (1939) as 
being the "leading Utah case on the distinction existing 
between false arrest and false imprisonment". In Hepworth 
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the plaintiff was at a dancehall in the company of two 
other young men, one of them a minor. While sitting 
in the lounge they were confronted by two "floor-walkers" 
employed by the defendant. The floor-walkers demanded 
that the plaintiff and his friends accompany them to 
an office and they "booked" them for possession of 
liquor. Upon the trial of the case the plaintiff obtained 
a verdict• On appeal the defendant quarreled with some 
of the instructions given to the jury. The defendant 
had requested instructions emphasizing the elements of 
an "arrest". As noted by the Supreme Court, the implica-
tion was that "if the officer did not intend to arrest 
Hepworth, then the latter is not entitled to recover". 
The Court noted that the true issue was not whether the 
officer had intended to "arrest" the plaintiff, but 
whether there was in fact a false imprisonment, that is, 
whether by an exercise of force, express or implied, the 
plaintiff had been deprived of his liberty and compelled 
to go where he did not want to, that is, to accompany 
the floor-walkers to the office. The Court noted that it 
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was immaterial to the issue of whether the defendant 
had committed the tort of false imprisonment whether 
the defendant's employee had in fact intended to 
"arrest". The Court noted that if "thle officer's 
acts and words were such as to reasonably create in 
Hepworth's mind the belief of a necessity of conforming 
to those demands or suffer the consequences, and 
Hepworth conformed rather than to change the conse-
quences, he was restrained of his liberty- Call the 
acts and words of the officer what you may — an arrest 
or not — the restraint was just as effective* The 
jury might well believed from the facts that Hepworth1s 
liberty was restrained quite aside fro^ i whether or not 
they believe the officer intended making an arrest." 
The Court then draws the usual, and proper, distinction 
between false arrest and false imprisonment, making it 
clear that there is but one tort, that of false imprison-
ment, and that it may be committed with or without a 
false "arrest". The only difference is that false 
arrest is merely one method by which one may commit 
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the tort of false imprisonment. 
False arrest and false imprisonment as causes 
of action are indistinguishable and the only distinction 
lies in the manner in which they arise, Alsup v. Skaggs 
Drug Center, 223 P.2d 530 (Okla. 1950), Harrer v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 221 P.2d 428, 124 Mont. 295, 
Holland v. Lutz, 401 P.2d 1015 (Kan. 1965)• 
False arrest and false imprisonment are essen-
tially synonymous and may be defined as the detention of 
a person without his consent and without lawful authority, 
Slade v. City of Phoenix, 541 P.2d 550 (Ariz. 1975), 
Kaufman v. Brown, 209 P.2d 156, 93 Cal.App.2d 508. 
If one looks in AmJur2d under the heading of 
"False Arrest", the only notation found thereunder are 
the words "see false imprisonment". 
In 32 AmJur2d, False Imprisonment,Sections 1 
and 2, page 74, false imprisonment is defined as the 
unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty 
of another. With regard to the distinction between false 
arrest and false imprisonment, it is noted in AmJur that 
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False arrest and false imprisonment 
as causes of action are said to be 
distinguishable only in terminology. 
The difference between them lies in 
the manner in which they arise. 
The Restatement of Torts, Second, Sections 35-45, 
defines the tort in terms of "the interest in freedom 
from confinement". The Restatement sets forth many 
examples of conduct which would give rise to liability, 
including cases where the actor confines the plaintiff 
in a room, digs a pit into which he might fall, 
threatens him with bodily harm if he does not stay in 
one particular place, or purports to arrest. No distinc-
tion is drawn between "false arrest" and "false imprison-
ment". The Restatement makes it clear that the only 
distinction is in the manner in which the tort of false 
imprisonment is accomplished. 
The last Utah Supreme Court case found which 
discusses false imprisonment in detail is Mildon v. 
Bybee, 375 P.2d 458, 13 Utah 2d 400 (1962). The Court 
there simply noted that "false imprisonment occurs whenever 
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there is an unlawful detention or restraint of another 
against his will". The Court makes reference to Section 
76-21-1, Utah Code Ann., which simply defined the crime 
of false imprisonment as being "the unlawful violation 
of the personal liberty of another". No distinction 
Was drawn between false arrest and false imprisonment. 
As is apparent from the foregoing analysis, 
there is in fact no substantive distinction between 
false arrest and false imprisonment. There is but one 
tort, that of false imprisonment. If the false imprison-
ment is accomplished by who purports to take the other 
into custody pursuant to some type of legal authority, 
then the tort is oftentimes referred to as "false arrest". 
There are no cases which stand for the proposi-
tion propounded by Appellant, that is, that there are 
two separate torts and thus a one year Statute of Limi-
tations for false imprisonment and a four year Statute 
of Limitations for false arrest. 
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POINT III. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
HAD EXPIRED BY THE TIME THE APPELLANT 
FILED HIS COMPLAINT. 
On page 14 of Appellant's Brief it is 
asserted, without authority, that the claim in this 
case did not accrue until the conclusion of the 
criminal case, at which time the plaintiff herein 
was acquitted of the crime of shoplifting. Concededly 
the plaintiff was acquitted in February, 1975, and 
the action was filed in December, 1975. If in fact 
the cause of action did not arise until February of 
1975, then the Complaint was timely filed. Such, 
however, is not the law, the authorities consistently 
holding that the cause of action for false imprisonment 
arises at the time the imprisonment terminates and 
not from the time when the proceedings under which the 
plaintiff's arrest occurred ended* 32 AmJur2d, False 
Imprisonment, Section 84, page 141; Alexander v. 
Thompson, 195 Fed. 31 (CA 6th, Mich.); feackler v. Miller, 
79 Neb. 206, 112 NW 303; Oosterwyk v. Bucholtz, 27 NW2d 
361, 250 Wis. 521. 
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A cause of action for false imprisonment 
accrues upon the discharge from imprisonment even 
though legal proceedings under the arrest have not 
yet terminated, Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d 
423 (Okla. 1955). A collection of cases setting 
forth the same rule is found in 4 9 ALR 2d 922. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
CORRECT IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Appellant contends that the Lower Court 
erred because Rule 9(h), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, provides in part that a party who pleads the 
statute must specify the statute relied upon and 
may allege generally that the cause of action is 
barred by the provisions of that statute. The last 
sentence of the rule provides: 
If such allegation is controverted, 
the party pleading the statute must 
establish, on the trial, the facts 
showing that the cause of action 
is so barred. 
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The problem with Appellant's argument is 
that the allegation was not controverted. It was 
stipulated that the plaintiff!s claim was solely 
for false arrest and occurred more thdn one year 
prior to the filing of the Conplaint. Under such 
circumstances the Court was fully justified, and 
in fact required, by Rule 56(c) to rule in favor 
of the defendants when the pleadings, Repositions 
and admissions on file showed that "there (was) no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party (was) entitled to a Judgment as a mat-
ter of law", 
CONCLUSION 
1. The plaintiff slept on h;Ls rights and 
did not file his Complaint until more than one year 
had elapsed. 
2. The plaintiff's claim is for false 
arrest or imprisonment and is barred by the Statute 
of Limitations. 
3. There is no distinction between false 
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arrest and false imprisonment which would justify the 
application of any Statute of Limitations other than 
Section 78-12-29, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
4. The ruling of the Trial Court was cor-
rect. 
It is respectfully submitted that the grant-
ing of Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants and 
against the plaintiff should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / T~ day of 
September, 1976. 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
By t U \ / Cj 
Allan L. LarsoJ 
Attorneys for defendants 
and Respondents 
700 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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